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Fiscal Policy in an Estimated Open-Economy Model 
for the Euro Area 
 





This paper uses an estimated DSGE model for the euro area to study the effects of fiscal 
stabilisation policies. There are at least two features of the euro area economy which makes this 
analysis interesting. First, there are nominal rigidities in goods and labour markets, and there are 
financial market frictions with a significant share of liquidity constrained households. Second, the 
government is a major sector of the euro area economy. In this paper we look at fiscal 
stabilisation via government consumption, investment, transfers and wage taxes. We find 
empirical evidence for systematic countercyclical fiscal policy. Consistent with previous 
findings, there is a small positive fiscal multiplier in the case of transitory fiscal shocks.  We find 
that fiscal policy is effective in stabilising GDP in the presence of demand and supply shocks. 
Fiscal policy helps to reduce the demand externality arising from nominal rigidities. In addition 
automatic stabilisation via government transfers helps to smooth consumption of liquidity-
constrained household. Fiscal policy partly compensates the financial market distortion. With 
distorted goods, labour and financial markets we find that the estimated fiscal policy rules reduce 
fluctuations in euro area GDP by about 14 percent.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years considerable progress has been made in the estimation of New-Keynesian 
dynamic stochastic equilibrium (DSGE) models. Because these models explicitly derive 
behavioural equations from intertemporal optimisation of the private sector under technological, 
budget and institutional constraints such as imperfections in factor, goods and financial markets, 
they are well suited to analyse the impact of fiscal and monetary policy. In this framework, 
macroeconomic fluctuations are seen as the optimal response of the private sector to demand and 
supply shocks in various markets, given the constraints mentioned above. Therefore, they allow 
us to analyse to what extent fiscal and monetary policies can alleviate existing distortions by 
appropriately responding to macroeconomic shocks. 
 
 DSGE models have so far been used extensively to study the effects of monetary policy and the 
stabilising role of monetary rules. In particular it has been demonstrated that an active role for 
monetary policy arises from the presence of nominal rigidities in goods and factor markets. So 
far, not much work has been devoted towards exploring the role of fiscal stabilisation in the New 
Keynesian model. Empirical work has concentrated mainly on an analysis of the effects of 
government spending shocks. (see Gali et al. (2003),  Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. 
(2006)). This work was motivated by understanding correlation patterns between fiscal variables 
and private consumption in macroeconomic time series. To our knowledge, less attention has 
been devoted to an empirical analysis of the stabilising role of fiscal policy itself. This paper 
therefore extends this literature by focussing on an analysis of the magnitude of fiscal 
stabilisation in the euro area at an aggregate level, i.e. we ask the question, what has been the 
stabilising power of fiscal policy in responding to euro area wide shocks over the period 1981-
2005?  
 
There are at least two features of the euro area economy which makes this analysis interesting. 
First, markets in the euro area do not function perfectly. There is substantial empirical evidence 
that prices and wages adjust sluggishly to supply and demand shocks as documented in numerous 
studies of wage and price behaviour, starting from early Phillips curve estimates (see, for 
example, Phelps (1967)) and extending to recent estimates using both backward as well as 
forward looking price and wage rules (see e.g. Gali et al. (2001) ). The recent work by Gali et al. 
(2003), Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2006) has also highlighted the presence of 
liquidity constraints as an additional market imperfection. The introduction of non-Ricardian 
behaviour in the model could give rise to a role for fiscal stabilisation, since liquidity constrained 
households do not respond to interest rate signals and there is little that can be done by monetary 
policy.     
 
Second, the government sector forms a major share of the euro area economy. Government 
consumption constitutes 20% of GDP. Government transfers to households make up a similar 
share.  The latter help to smooth income of private households over the business cycle, especially 
in the form of pensions and unemployment insurance. Government expenditure is financed by 
consumption, labour income and capital taxes. The tax system, especially the income tax, 
provides additional stabilisation via a progressive tax code.  
 
Obviously, a prerequisite for such an analysis is a proper empirical representation of the data 
generating process. The seminal work of Smets and Wouters (2003) has shown that DSGE 
models can in fact provide a satisfactory representation of the main macroeconomic aggregates. 
This paper extends the basic DSGE model in four directions. First, it respects the unit root   5
character of macroeconomic time series by allowing for stochastic trends in TFP, second it treats 
the euro area as an open economy, third it adds financial market imperfections in the form of 
liquidity constrained households to imperfections in the form of nominal rigidities in goods and 
labour markets and, fourth, it introduces a government sector with stabilising demand policies. 
We empirically identify government spending rules by specifying current government 
consumption and transfers as functions of their own lags as well as current and lagged output and 
unemployment gaps. In other words, our fiscal rules resemble the well-known Taylor rule for 
interest rates. However, we do not find a significant response of fiscal policy to deviations of 
inflation from the target rate. From the operation of the euro area unemployment insurance 
system we know that unemployment benefits provide quasi-automatic income stabilisation. 
Indeed we find a significant response of transfers to cyclical variations in employment. A priori 
government consumption is not explicitly countercyclical, though it can already provide 
stabilisation by keeping expenditure fixed in nominal terms over the business cycle. The 
empirical evidence suggests that fiscal policy is used in a countercyclical fashion in the euro area. 
The question we focus on in this paper is how much stabilisation is provided by active fiscal 
policy, taking into account all the stochastic shocks that we identify over the period 1981Q1 to 
2005Q3. We find that fiscal policy has reduced the standard deviation of output growth by about 
14 percent over that period.  
 
Our results can be compared to other papers that have investigated the stabilising effects of fiscal 
policy. Fatas and Mihov (2003) question the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is counter-
cyclical. They investigate the effect of discretionary policy and use government spending data for 
a large cross-section of countries. They regress government spending growth on output growth 
(and additional control variables) and interpret the residual of the estimated equation as the 
indicator of the discretionary spending shock. They find that highly volatile discretionary fiscal 
policy exerts a strong destabilising effect on the economy. The volatility of output induced by 
discretionary fiscal policy lowers economic growth by more than 0.8 percentage points for every 
percentage point increase in volatility. 
 
Artis and Onorante (2006) analyse whether in the past discretionary fiscal policy in EMU has 
been effective in smoothing the economic cycle, or whether fiscal policy has been procyclcial and 
increased the amplitude of the cycle. They estimate a small model for growth, the deficit ratio 
and inflation and compare the variance of synthetic economic cycles created by shutting down 
the permanent shock of the estimated structural model and producing counterfactual economic 
cycles by changing assumptions on the fiscal shocks. They find that fiscal policy has had overall 
a limited, if any, smoothing effect on the cycle. Shutting down the discretionary component of 
fiscal policy approaches closest the “best fiscal policy” in their simulations. 
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In section one we describe the model and characterise the 
shocks hitting the euro area economy. Section two briefly presents the empirical fit of our DSGE 
model. Section three analyses fiscal stabilisation and section four concludes. 
 
1. The  Model 
 
We consider an open economy which faces an exogenous world interest rate, world prices and 
world demand. The domestic and foreign regions produce a continuum of differentiated goods.   6
The goods produced in the home country are imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. 
The model economy is populated by households and firms and there is a monetary and fiscal 
authority, both following rules based stabilisation policies. We distinguish between households 
which are liquidity constrained and consume their disposable income and households who can 





There is a final goods and an investment goods production sector, populated with two types of 
firms. In the final goods sector 
d n  firms indexed by j  produce goods which are imperfect 
substitutes Final output is consumed by private households and the government (domestic and 
abroad) and serves as an input for a perfectly competitive investment goods sector. Firms in the 
investment goods sector transform final goods into a single investment good which is used in the 
final goods sector. Firms are owned by households and pay dividends. 
 
1.1.1 Final output producers 
 
Each firm produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties 
produced by other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are monopolistically 
competitive in the goods market and face a demand function for goods. Domestic firms sell to 
private domestic households, to other firms the government and to exporting firms. All demand 
sectors have identical CES preferences across varieties, with a time-varying elasticity of 
substitution 1/τt. The demand function for firm j consistent with preferences (see section 1.4 for a 
more detailed description) is given by 
 































In what follows it is assumed that firms influence the demand for domestic goods with their 
pricing decision, however, they are small with respect to the total market and therefore take as 
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t where the parameter 
1 > θ  determines the degree of substitutability. Firms also decide about the degree of capacity 
utilisation (
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And the drift term 
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We allow the share of overhead labour 
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The objective of the firm is to maximise the present discounted value of its cash flows. The link 
to the household sector is as follows. Domestic firms are owned by domestic households. All 
investment is equity financed and the firms pay dividends to the household sector. Dynamic 
considerations enter the problem of the firms because firms face quadratic costs of changing 
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 is the discount factor, which consists of the short term interest rate 
and a risk premium (rp). The risk premium can be subject to random shocks and generated by the 
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CAP − + − =  , with ucap*=1. 
 
The adjustment costs for capital and labour are subject to autocorrelated random shocks 
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The firm determines labour input, the capital stock, capacity utilisation and prices optimally in 
each period given the technological and administrative constraints as well as demand conditions. 
The first order conditions, neglecting second order terms, are given by: 
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Firms equate the marginal product of aggregate labour, net of labour adjustment costs to the real 
wage rate (eq. 8a). As can be seen from the left hand side of equation (8a), the convex part of the 
adjustment cost function penalises changes in employment. In a second step firms decide about 
demand for different varieties of labour (8b). Equations (8c-e) jointly determine the optimal 
capital stock and optimal capacity utilisation. The firm equates the marginal product of capital to 
the rental price of capital, adjusted for capital costs. The firm also equates the marginal product 
of capital services (K*ucap) to the marginal cost of capacity utilisation. Equation (8f) defines the 
mark up factor as a function of the elasticity of substitution and changes in inflation. We follow 
Smets and Wouters and allow for additional backward looking elements by assuming that a 
fraction (1-sfp) of firms keep prices fixed at the t-1 level. This leads to the following 
specification: 
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1.2.2 Investment goods producers 
 
There is a perfectly competitive sector which combines domestic and foreign final goods, using 
the same CES functions as households and governments do to produce investment goods for the 
domestic economy. Denote the aggregate of domestic and foreign inputs used by the investment   9
goods sector with 
inp
t I , then real output of the investment goods sector is produced by the 










t U  is a technology shock to the investment good production technology which itself 
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Given our assumption concerning the input used in the investment goods production sector, 









The household sector consists of a continuum of households  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ h . A share  ) 1 ( slc −  of these 
households are not liquidity constrained and indexed by  [ ) slc i − ∈ 1 , 0 . They have full access to 
financial markets, they buy and sell domestic and foreign assets (government bonds and equity). 
The remaining share slc of households is liquidity constrained and indexed by  [ ] 1 , 1 slc k − ∈ . 
These households do not trade on asset markets and consume their disposable income each 
period. We follow Coenen et al. (2005) and assume that both types of households supply 
differentiated labour services to unions which act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive 
labour markets. The unions pool wage income and distribute it in equal proportions among their 
members. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced by assuming that the household faces 
adjustment costs for changing wages. These adjustment costs are borne by the household.  
 
1.2.1 Non Liquidity constrained households 
 
Each non liquidity constrained household decides about four types of assets, domestic and 




t B B , ), stocks of domestic companies (
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t tK Q ) and cash balances (
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t M ). 
Households maximize an intertemporal utility function subject to a budget constraint. The 
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The utility function is additively separable in consumption (
i
t C ) and leisure (
i
t L − 1 ). We assume 
CES utility for consumption and for leisure and in addition we allow for habit persistence. Thus 
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and  
NPART
t e  denotes an autocorrelated shock to the share of households non-participating in the 
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The consumption index is itself an aggregate over varieties of domestic and foreign goods which 
are imperfect substitutes. These preferences are expressed by a nested CES utility function. It is 
assumed that households, firms and the government have identical preferences over domestic and 
foreign varieties in order to facilitate aggregation. The sub utility functions are described in more 
detail in section 1.4 below.  
 
The household decides about consumption, asset allocation, the supply of labour and real money 
holdings







t L W t ) 1 ( − ), net transfer income from the government (
i
t NETTR ), dividend 
                                                 
1 With an interest rate rule as specified below, an optimality condition for money would only determine the desired 
money holdings of the household sector without any further consequence for the rest of the economy. For that reason 
any further discussion on money demand is dropped here.    11
income from the domestic corporate sector  ) ( 1
i
t t t t K Q PC div −  and interest income from government 
and foreign bonds. A trading friction for foreign bonds is introduced, expressed as a function of 










t e e ε ρ + = −1 , with  ) , 0 ( ~
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t N σ ε . The risk premium captures the cost for the 
domestic household of undertaking positions in the international capital market. As borrower, the 
household is charged a premium on the foreign interest rate and as lender he receives a 
remuneration which is below the foreign interest rate. The first order conditions of the household 
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The first arbitrage condition requires that up to a risk premium, the return from a domestic bond 
is equal to the return from a foreign bond expressed in the domestic currency. The second 
arbitrage condition requires that the return from equity, i. e. dividends plus changes in the value 
of the capital stock plus changes in the price of capital goods is equal to the nominal interest rate. 
 
1.2.2 Liquidity constrained households 
 
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their entire labour income 
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   12
1.2.3  Wage setting 
 
Workers from each household have market power in the labour market, because they offer 
services, which are imperfect substitutes to services offered by other workers. There is a 
continuum of monopolistically competitive unions indexed over the same range as households 
[] 1 , 0 ∈ h  which act as wage setters for the differentiated labour services. In a monopolistic labour 
market the elasticity of substitution between different types of labour  determines the mark-up of 
wages over the equilibrium wage. This elasticity is defined by  
 
































Now the wage setting rule can be derived taking derivatives of the Lagrangian w.r.t. wages. 
Using symmetry:  t
i
t W W =  and neglecting second order terms allows us to formulate a wage 
setting rule in terms of wage inflation 
W
t π  as  
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w mup  which goes to zero as the substitutability between different 
types of labour goes to infinity. Households are setting the real net consumption wage as a mark 
up over the value of leisure which is defined as the marginal utility of leisure divided by the 
marginal utility of consumption.. This formulation generalises the neoclassical labour supply 
model along two dimensions. First, because of imperfect substitutability between different types 
of labour, households can set a consumption wage which is above the reservation wage as 
determined by the value of leisure. The magnitude of the wage mark up depends on the degree of 
substitutability between varieties of labour. Second, by introducing convex wage adjustment 
costs ( 0 > w γ ), workers want to smooth wage adjustments, taking into account current and future 
expected labour market conditions. Notice, like in the goods market, we assume that a fraction 
(1-sfw) of workers index wage inflation to inflation in period t-1. This first order condition can be 
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We assume that fiscal and monetary policy is partly rules based and partly discretionary. Policy 
responds to an output gap indicator of the business cycle. Consistent with our production function 




































t L  and 
ss
t ucap  are moving average steady state employment rate and capacity utilisation: 
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This concept of an output gap was chosen because we want to be as close as possible to the 
standard practice of calculating output gaps that is used in fiscal surveillance in the euro area (see 
Denis et al. (2002)).  
 
1.3.1   Fiscal Policy 
 
Both expenditure and receipts are responding to business cycle conditions. On the expenditure 
side we identify the systematic response of government consumption, government transfers and 
government investment to the business cycle.  
 
We allow the share of government consumption in GDP 
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Government consumption and government investment can temporarily deviate from their long 
run targets in response to fluctuations of the output gap. Due to information and implementation   14
lags the response may occur with some delay. This feature is captured by a distributed lag of the 
output gap in the reaction function. A discussion about the actual identification of the number of 
lags is given later in Section 2. 
 
Concerning the transfer rule we impose more institutional information. The transfer system in the 
euro area provides income for unemployed and for pensioners and acts as an automatic stabiliser. 
The state–contingent nature of transfers implies a correlation with cyclical conditions, namely the 
current employment gap. The degree of stabilisation is proportional to the unemployment benefit 
and pension replacement rate 
U b  and 
P b  respectively and we can write the following transfer 
rule 
 















































trsn =   and rewrite the transfer rule in terms of log deviations of the employment 

























Discretionary fiscal action is characterised by the variables 
g
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t R are financed by taxes on consumption as well as capital and labour 
income.  
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Following the OECD estimates for revenue elasticities (van den Noord (2000)) we assume that 
consumption and capital income tax follow a linear scheme, and a progressive labour income tax 
schedule 
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w t0 measures the average tax rate, 
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and there is a residual lump-sum tax (Tax)  used for controlling the debt to GDP ratio according 
to the following rule 
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where btar is the government debt target.  
 
 
1.3.2   Central bank policy rule (interest rate rule) 
 
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some smoothness of 
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t N σ ε  and 
T π  is the inflation target. 
 
 
1.4  Trade and the current account  
 
So far we have only determined aggregate consumption, investment and government purchases 
but not the allocation of expenditure over domestic and foreign goods. In order to facilitate 
aggregation we assume that households, the government and the corporate sector have identical 
preferences across goods used for private consumption (C), public consumption (G) and 
investment (I). Let  { } G I C X
l l l , , ∈  be demand of an individual household, investor or the 
government, then her preferences are given by the following utility function 
 
(28a) 
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where 
d l X  and 
f l X  are indexes of demand across the continuum of differentiated goods 








































































We define  t τ  to measure the inverse of the time varying elasticity of demand for variety h and 
assume that it is itself stochastic and also allow for some cyclical variation. The term  t τ  is given 
by (see eq. (15e’))   16
(28c)  
τ τ τ t t e + =
0  
  
The elasticity of substitution between bundles of domestic and foreign goods 
d l X  and 
f l X  is 
σ . Thus aggregate imports are given by 
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where  PC and PM is the (utility based) consumer price deflator and import price deflator 
respectively and 
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We assume similar demand behaviour in the rest of the world, therefore exports can be treated 
symmetrically and are given by
2 
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where  t PX  and  t E  are export prices an the nominal exchange rate, 
W
t PC  are world consumer 
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Prices for exports and imports are set by domestic and foreign exporters respectively. The 
exporter buys goods from domestic producers and sells them in the foreign (domestic) market. It 
is assumed that the exporters are monopolistically competitive in their respective export markets. 
Exporters charge a mark-up over domestic prices (linear technology) and their pricing is subject 
to convex adjustment costs . Thus export prices are given by 
 
(31a)  t t
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with a mark-up factor determined by 
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2  Exports EX include intra euro area trade, with a share (1-α
X). 
   17
We assume that monopolistic competition applies to the foreign firms as well. There is no pricing 
to market and import prices are given by 
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Exports and imports together with interest receipts/payments determine the evolution of net 
foreign assets (NFA) denominated in domestic currency.  
 
(33)  t t t t t t
F
t t t IM PM EX PX NFA E i NFA E − + + = −1 ) 1 (  
 
 
2. Estimation   
 
Our technological assumptions imply that domestic and foreign GDP and its components are 
stationary in growth rates. Our model implies that various nominal ratios such as the consumption 
to GDP ratio (CSN), the investment to GDP ratio (ISN), the government consumption to GDP 
ratio (GSN), the government investment to GDP ratio (GISN), the government transfers to wages 
ratio (TRSN) the export (EXSN) and import (IMSN
3) share in GDP, the wage share (WSN), the 
employment rate (L) and the real exchange rate (ER) are stationary. Concerning nominal 
variables we assume that the domestic and foreign inflation target is a constant. This implies that 
domestic wage inflation rate (
w π ), foreign and domestic price inflation (π ,
F π ) rates and 
nominal domestic and foreign interest rates (i, 
F i ) are stationary,  as well as certain price ratios, 
in particular the relative consumer price (PC/P) and the relative import (PM/P)and export price 
(PX/P)  ratios.  These variables, together with the following exogenous variables: growth of 
population of working age (g
popa), the demographic dependency ratio (deprat) and the technology 
shock to the investment good production (
I U ) form our information set. World economy series 
[
F i , 
F π , g
YW] are considered as exogenous and are modeled as a VAR(1) process. To assure 
stationarity of the Y/Y
W ratio, an equilibrium correction term is added to the g
YW equation. This 
introduces a small feedback of domestic demand into world demand. The model is estimated on 
quarterly data for the euro area over the period from 1981Q1 to 2005Q3, taken from the ECB 
AWM data base and updated with Eurostat quaterly national accounts database. 
 
The parameters listed in Table 1 are calibrated and kept constant over the estimation exercise: 
 
                                                 
3 Concerning the import and export share we remove a trade integration trend prior to estimation.   18
TABLE 1. Calibrated parameters 
 
Structural parameters  Steady states   
α   0.54 deprat  0.3 
β   0.996  gsn  0.2 
δ   0.025  gisn   0.025 
bgad1  4.e-6  UI g   0.0013 
bgad2  4.e-3  π ,
F π   0.005 
Bgtar  2.4  popa g   0.00125 
τ   0.1  Y g ,
YW g   0.003 
G ρ , trslag  0  UP g=
UI Y g g α
α − −
1   0.0019 
ucap ρ   0.975  ucap  1 
POP ρ   0.98  L   0.62 
p t ,
c t ,
0 w t   0.2     
α
X  0.5    
 
Other parameters are determined according to steady state constraints: 
•  )1/KSN - (1 * ) - (1   1 α τ = a , determined in order to assure the steady state constraint 
UCAP=1, where  P PI Y K KSN / * / =  is the nominal capital to GDP share. 
•  ω  is determined in order to assure the steady state condition  62 . 0 = L  
 
The dynamical forms of government spending and government investment have been identified 
by estimating separately from the rest of the model an array of models of the general form: 
 
(34)   t t k m
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where L is the lagged operator. The selection of the model is then taken considering both the 
2 T R  
statistics, based on the response error, and information criteria.  
 
For both government consumption and investment, the input is the output gap. This implied a two 
step-procedure, where first the dynamical structure was identified using a HP-filtered output gap. 
The obtained structure and coefficients are fed into the DSGE model, which is estimated given 
the previously identified coefficients. At this stage, we obtain a model based output gap which is 
again fed into the separated identification procedure which gives the final structure. This second 
step identification is then used to define the prior distribution of the coefficients in the 
government spending rules, which are then estimated together with the other parameters in the 








G t t e YGAP t YGAP t gsn gslag gsn gslag gsn + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − = − − ) log( ) log( 1 1 1 , 0 , 1  
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The investment rule is given by 
 











t e e ε ρ + ⋅ = −1 . 
 
The model parameters are estimated applying the Bayesian approach as, e.g., Schorfheide (2000), 
Smets and Wouters (2003). From the computational point of view, the DYNARE toolbox for 
MATLAB has been applied (Juillard, 1996-2005).  
 
 
2.1 Prior distributions 
 
Exogenous AR shocks have beta distributions for auto-correlation coefficients with prior mean at 
0.85 except for mark-up shock, monetary shock, investment specific technological shock, wage 
tax rule shock, where we set prior mean to 0.5, where we did not have any ‘preference’ between a 
persistent shock or a white noise. Standard errors have prior gamma distributions, with prior 
mean values at  
•  0.1%-0.5% for ‘persistent shocks’ (accounting for different trends in the data, like 
participation rate, labour overhead, drift of technology) and for shocks to risk premia; 
•  1% for technology and investment specific technological shocks and nominal GDP shares 
of government consumption, investment, transfers; 
•  2% for import/export shocks; 
•  5% for preference shock and mark-up shocks 
 
For fiscal parameters, we set a prior around zero for 
Y




G t t 1 , 0 , + , to let the data drive pro-
cyclical or counter-cyclical reaction of government consumption to output gap. For government 
investment, we set the prior of 
Y
IG t 1 ,  at 0.5, i.e. pro-cyclical response. For transfers we set prior 
mean of 
L
TR t  at 0.6, which roughly corresponds to a benefit replacement rate of about 40%. For 
wage tax, we set a prior at 0.8 for the reaction to output gap, following OECD estimate. Since no 
taxation data are used, it is hard to have a clear identification of 
W t1  in the current exercise, so 
putting a prior range around OECD estimate has the meaning of checking that a calibrated value 
around 0.8 is not rejected from available data on consumption and government expenditures. 
Persistence in the government spending and investment rules has a prior at 0.85, while for 
transfers this is set to zero. 
 
For price and wage rigidities we roughly follow Smets and Wouters, but allowing a wider 
variation in the upper bound (prior mean at 30). Capital and labour adjustment costs have similar 
priors, while for investment the prior is smaller (15). Prior consumption habit is set at 0.7. Inverse 
of intertemporal elasticities have prior gamma distributions with mean 1.25 and standard 
deviation 0.5, while θ  has a mean 1.5 and standard deviation 1. The share of liquidity 
constrained households has a prior at 0.5, with standard deviation 0.1, similarly to Forni et al. 
(2006). 
 
The share of forward looking behaviour in hybrid Phillips curves has prior mean at 0.5 in the 
range [0, 1]. 
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2.2 Posterior estimation 
 
The draws from the posterior distribution have been obtained by taking 800,000 runs of 
Metropolis. Convergence of the Markov Chain has been tested by cumulated means. The shape 
of the likelihood at the posterior mode and the Hessian condition number have been also 
considered to highlight lack of identification for some parameters
4. In Table 2.1 we show prior 
distributions and posterior estimations of our structural parameters (see Table A1 in the annex for 
estimates of standard errors of shocks and AR coefficients of autocorrelated shocks and Figure 
A1 for the plots of priors and posterior distributions).  
 
TABLE 2.1:  Estimation Results 
 
Prior Posterior  Parameter name 
distrib mean  Std  mean  std 
2 a   A2E beta  0.05  0.024  0.0212  0.009882 
Y
G t 0 ,   G1E beta  0  0.6  -0.5339  0.141886 
Y




G t t 1 , 0 , +   GSUM beta  0  0.04  0.0041  0.021663 
K γ   GAMIE gamma  30  20  22.9549  4.474299 
I γ   GAMI2E gamma  15 10 15.6589  5.406387 
L γ   GAMLE gamma  30 20 63.1248  11.80929 
P γ   GAMPE gamma  30 20 20.6431  7.343065 
PX γ   GAMPXE gamma  30  20  24.411 13.40898 
W γ   GAMWE gamma  30  20  26.5775  13.80058 
gslag  GSLAG  beta 0.85 0.075 0.8865  0.034234 
habc  HABE  beta 0.7  0.1  0.9352  0.023471 
habl  HABLE  beta 10  4  8.1037  1.616638 
Y
IG t 1 ,   IG1E beta  0.5  0.22  0.5424  0.140532 
igslag  IGSLAG beta  0.85  0.075  0.8318  0.061033 
ilag  ILAGE  beta 0.85 0.075 0.8597  0.023116 
κ   KAPPAE  gamma 1.25  0.5  2.9125  0.485373 
risk  RPREME  beta 0.01 0.004 0.0063  0.002974 
rp  RPREMK  beta 0.01 0.004 0.0056  0.00267 
X ω   SE  beta 0.695  0.018 0.7295  0.005687 
XW ω   SWE   0.695    0.723305  0.008617 
XW X ω ω −   SEDIFF beta  0 0.0075  0.0062  0.00649 
sfp  SFPE  beta 0.5  0.24  0.9218  0.052931 
sfpx  SFPXE  beta 0.5  0.24  0.9539  0.033822 
sfw  SFWE  beta 0.5  0.24  0.9523  0.026466 
                                                 
4 Only for two structural parameters does the likelihood not dominate the prior, namely for export price and wage 
rigidities ( PX γ  and  W γ ). A similar lack of identification for  W γ  seems also present in Smets and Wouters (2003) ( 
see also Canova and Sala (2005) about identification problems in the Smets and Wouters model and inDSGE models 
in general)   21
C σ   SIGC  gamma 1.25  0.5  2.64  0.476742 
X σ   SIGEXE  gamma 1.25  0.5  1.4431  0.135808 
σ   SIGIME  gamma 1.25  0.5  0.6116  0.119259 
slc  SLC  beta 0.5  0.1  0.6312  0.071708 
spm  SPM  beta 0.5  0.2  0.4615  0.056821 
θ   THETAE  gamma 1.5  1  2.1465  0.606874 
π
M t   TINFE  beta 0.3  0.1  0.32  0.03606 
Y
M t 1 ,   TYE1 beta  0.3  0.2  0.0326  0.008626 
Y
M t 2 ,   TYE2 beta  0.3  0.2  0.1627  0.072934 
w t1   TW1 beta  0.8  0.32  0.7661  0.320313 
L
TR t   TR1E beta  -0.6  0.2  -0.5367  0.058461 
dep
TR t   TR3E beta  1  0.4  0.6178  0.193613 
trsn  TRSN beta  0.4  0.04  0.3988  0.014337 
 
 
The estimated fraction of forward looking price setting behaviour is high. The posterior mean for 
sfp is estimated at 0.92, which implies only 8 percent of firms keep prices fixed at the t-1 level. 
The estimated share of liquidity-constrained consumers is 0.63, which is higher than estimates 
reported in Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2006). Note that our estimates also 
suggest a significant degree of habit persistence in consumption, habc=0.93 and an intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of around 0.4.   
 
The estimated fiscal response parameters are counter-cyclical for government consumption and 
transfers. Government consumption is highly persistent and responds to the current change in the 




G t t 1 , 0 , +  is in fact not significantly different from 
zero). We find a negative response of transfers to the employment gap (
L
TR t ), corresponding to a 
benefit replacement rate of about 0.4. The investment rule appears procyclical, with a high degree 
of persistence. The only parameter relevant for stabilisation policy on the revenues side is the 
degree of progressivity of wage taxes. Due to a lack of reliable data on tax rates we estimate this 
parameter with a tight prior distribution around an OECD estimate. The posterior mean of 
progressivity of the tax system 
1 w
t t is 0.77
5, which is close to our prior based on the OECD 
estimate of the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the output gap
6. By way of comparison, 
other studies that have analysed the actual behaviour of fiscal authorities have mainly focused on 
the overall deficit rather than on government expenditure catagories seperately. Gali and Perotti 
(2003) assess the extent to which the constraints associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth pact have made fiscal policy in EMU countries more procyclical. They find 
discretionary fiscal policy (as measured by the primary cyclically adjusted deficit of general 
government) was procyclical in EMU countries before Maastricht and essentially acyclical after 
Maastricht. They also find an increase in the degree in counter-cyclicality of non-discretionary 
                                                 
5 Note that the likelihood does not dominate the prior, i.e. not using taxation data implies a lack of identification for 
1 w
t t . The only conclusion we can draw is hence that the OECD prior is not rejected by the dataset used for 
estimation. 
6 The OECD calculates an elasticity of income tax revenue with respect to the output gap of 1.5 and an elasticity of 
the wage bill w.r.t. the gap of 0.7. This implies an elasticity of the tax rate w.r.t. to output gap of 0.8.   22
fiscal policy (as measured by the difference between the total primary deficit and the cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit) in EMU countries. European Commission (2004, Ch.3)  also find 
evidence of a change in the response of the total primary budget balance to the output gap, with 
an insignificant impact of the cycle on primary balances before 1994 and a significant positive 
impact of the output gap on the primary balance post 1994.  
 
In Figure 1 we show the one step ahead predictions of the model for the growth rates of GDP 
(
Y g ), consumption (
C g ), investment (
I g ), imports and exports (
IM g  and 
EX g ), labour (
L g ), 
government consumption (
G g ), government investment (
GI g ), government transfers (
TR g ), as 
well as for inflations (π ,
C π ,
M π ,
X π ), wage inflation (
W π ), growth rate of investment specific 
technological progress (
UI g ), nominal interest rates (i, 
F i ), nominal exchange rate (
E g ), world 
inflation (
F π ), world GDP (
YW g ).  
We also show the fit of nominal ratios to GDP of consumption (CSN) export (EXSN), 
government consumption (GSN), government investment (GISN), investment (ISN),  transfers to 
wages ratio (TRSN), the real foreign GDP to domestic GDP ratio (YWY) as well as the 
stationary real exchange rate (ER), labour (L), wage share (WS), consumption to GDP deflator 
(PC/P), import to GDP deflator (PM/P), export to GDP  deflator (PX/P). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. In-sample one step ahead predictions of the estimated model.  










































































































































































































2.3 Model comparisons 
 
A quite widely applied method to assess the validity of the estimated DSGE models is to compare 
them with non-structural linear reduced-form models such as VARs or BVARs. In Table 2.2, 
where we compare our base model with BVAR models (lags 1 to 13) using Sims and Zha (1998) 
priors. The marginal likelihood of the BVAR models begins to deteriorate after order 9. Similarly 
to other estimated DSGE’s in the literature, our base model has a better marginal likelihood than 
BVAR’s. Although the robustness of these kinds of results may depend on different prior 
assumptions in both the DSGE and the BVAR, this is an indication that our base model has a 


















Base DSGE model  9044.2 
 
 
We also compared our base model with a model specifications where all the fiscal rules are 
exogenous, i.e. where    25
(37a)   ()
G
t t t e gsn gslag gsn gslag gsn + ⋅ + ⋅ − = −1 1  
(37b)   ()
GI
t t t e gisn gislag gisn gislag gisn + ⋅ + ⋅ − = −1 1  






TR t t e
POP
POP





t e t t + = 0  
 
This is shown in Table 2.3, where it can be seen that the base model improves the marginal 
likelihood by more than 100 log-points with respect to the model with exogenous G, GI, TR, TW 
(estimates are reported in Annex 2). Looking into more detail about the fit (RMSE’s) of each 
singular series in the two model specifications, it can be seen that the improvement of the fit in 
our base model is very significant, as would be expected, for the government variables G, GI, TR. 
As far as other endogenous variables are concerned, the dynamics of wage inflation is also much 
better described by our base model, while the other endogenous variables have minor changes, 
e.g. the fit of aggregate consumption growth (
C g ) and nominal interest rates for the base model 
is slightly worse, while it is slightly better for employment (
L g ) and output (
Y g ) growth and 
consumer price inflation (
C







G, IG, TR, 
TW 
Marginal likelihood 9044.2  8891.6 
rmse 
Y
t g 0.005349 0.005381 
rmse 
C
t g 0.004805 0.004725 
rmse 
I
t g 0.014592 0.014599 
rmse 
G
t g 0.005871 0.006238 
rmse 
IG
t g   0.008378 0.009115 
rmse 
TR
t g 0.004831 0.006807 
rmse 
L
t g 0.001428 0.001435 
rmse 
W
t π 0.006207 0.007053 
rmse  t inom 0.001116 0.001077 
rmse  t π 0.004018 0.004029 
rmse 
C
t π 0.003013 0.003148 
rmse 
M
t π 0.012412 0.012328 
rmse 
X
t π 0.005971 0.00599 
rmse 
E
t g 0.029785 0.029739 
rmse 
EX
t g 0.021004 0.020241 
rmse 
IM
t g 0.017223 0.017225   26
3. Assessing the Role of Fiscal Policy 
 
We now proceed to investigate the role of fiscal policy in stabilising the economy by analysing 
the impulse responses and variance decomposition of the estimated model. We first look at the 
effects of government consumption, investment and transfer shocks in the model, by comparing 
the responses of the estimated model with those without fiscal policy reactions to cyclical 








G t t t t t . We also compare the dynamic responses 
of the main economic variables to structural shocks in the estimated model with those when the 
fiscal response parameters are set to zero, i.e. in a model without systematic fiscal policy 
reactions to cyclical conditions and without persistence, i.e. 








G t t igslag t gslag t t . This is followed by a direct comparison of the 
standard deviations for the main economic variables, as generated by the model with and without 
active fiscal policy. 
 
 
3.1. How large are the effects of government consumption, investment and transfers 
shocks? 
 
Figures 2 to 4 show the response to a government consumption, investment and transfers shock 
respectively, for the estimated model (solid lines) and the model without active fiscal policy, i.e. 








G t t t t t , but with the estimated persistence (dotted lines). The 
magnitude of the shocks is given by the posterior estimate, i.e. we used the full joint posterior 
distribution of structural parameters and shocks to produce the Bayesian uncertainty bounds of 
IRFs. The government consumption and investment shocks raise government spending as a share 
of output, but spending gradually returns to baseline. We are particularly interested in the effect 
of liquidity constraints on the response of consumption to this shock. The second, fourth and fifth 
panels show the responses of aggregate consumption C, non liquidity-constrained consumption C
i 
and liquidity-constrained consumption C
k respectively. After a government consumption shock, 
consumption of Ricardian households C
i falls on impact, but consumption of liquidity 
constrained consumers C
k rises as wage income increases, although in later periods liquidity-
constrained consumption falls below baseline, as the build-up of debt leads to an increase in taxes 
and reduces after tax  income. In the model without fiscal policy reactions (dotted lines) 
aggregate consumption is also higher. However, in the estimated model with active fiscal policy, 
transfers fall as employment rises, and the negative impact of this on liquidity-constrained 
consumption C
k means that aggregate consumption C now falls
7. The spending shock crowds-out 
private investment. The responses of private consumption to a government investment shock are 
broadly similar, except that the estimated government investment rule is pro-cyclical.
8   
 
                                                 
7 Experiments show that only eliminating the reaction of the transfer rule to the employment gap would be sufficient 
to generate a positive response of aggregate consumption. 
8 Note that investment is assumed to be non-productive here, as we focus on short term stabilisation in this paper.   27
FIG. 2.   IRF’s to a government consumption shock. 
Solid lines are posterior means and confidence intervals for the estimated model, while dotted 
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FIGURE 3.   IRF’s to a government investment shock.  
Solid lines are posterior means and confidence intervals for the estimated model, while dotted 
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FIGURE 4.   IRF’s to a government transfers shock. 
Solid lines are posterior means and confidence intervals for the estimated model, while dotted 
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Figure 4 shows the responses to a government transfer shock. The increase in transfers raises 
disposable incomes and boosts liquidity-constrained consumption. There is a negative impact on 
consumption of non liquidity-constrained consumers, but this is much smaller and aggregate 
consumption is positively affected by the transfer shock. Again, fiscal policy crowds out private 
investment. 
 
Our results can be compared to Coenen and Straub (2005). They estimate a DSGE model for the 
euro area similar to Smets and Wouters (2003), but introduce non-Ricardian households in the 
model similar to our liquidity constrained consumers. For a lower share of non-Ricardian 
households (between 0.25 and 0.37) they find a short-lived rise in liquidity- constrained 
consumption, but falling below its steady state level already after a few quarters, caused by a rise 
in lump-sum taxes due to  the build up of government debt. Forni et al. (2006) find a positive 
response of consumption to both a government purchases and a government employment shock, 
but assume no fiscal response to cyclical conditions. 
 
To assess the impact of the government spending shocks on output in terms of traditional 
"multipliers", the impact effect for a 1 percent of government spending shock on GDP is 0.7 in 
the first quarter, falling to 0.5 in the fourth quarter. It remains positive for three to four years, and 
then turns negative. Cumulated over the first year the multiplier is 0.6. This is somewhat smaller 
than results reported in Roeger and in ’t Veld (2004) for the European Commission’s global 
macromodel QUEST, which shows multipliers for the largest four European countries between 
0.85 and 0.95
9. The estimated impact fiscal multiplier is within the range found in empirical 
studies of fiscal policy using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models. Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) applied SVAR methodology to study the effects of fiscal policy in the US and 
various authors have extended the SVAR methodology to include other countries. Perotti (2005) 
finds large differences in the effects of fiscal policy, with the responses of GDP and consumption 
having become weaker over time. Only for the US is the consumption response found positive 




3.2 What is the stabilising power of fiscal policy in the euro area? 
 
We now turn to the stabilisation power of fiscal policy in the euro area economy over the period 
1981q1 to 2005q3. Our empirical analysis takes into account all shocks that we identify in the 
model. Our strategy is to perform stochastic simulations with values drawn from the empirical 
distribution of the estimated shock processes under alternative fiscal policy rules. The benchmark 
rules for our analysis are the estimated tax rule (25) and  spending rules (35)-(37). We compare 
the volatility of the euro area economy to a “no systematic fiscal policy” scenario, where we also 
exclude the lagged dynamic responses and nominal government consumption, investment and 
transfers are always proportional to nominal GDP up to a stochastic shock, and the wage tax rate 








G t t gislag t gslag t t ) 
 
                                                 
9 There the government consumption shock is a weighted average of government purchases and wage expenditures. 
Wage expenditure shocks have larger effects on GDP than government purchases shocks. 
10 Reconciling the consumption response to a government consumption shock with evidence from Fatas and Mihov 
(2001) and Gali et al. (2003) is complicated by the fact that we do not make the distinction between government 
purchases of goods and services and government wage expenditure. A disaggregation of government consumption 
may require a seperate modelling of private and public sector . (see Forni et al (2006)).    31
In order to better understand the results from this comparison it is useful to look first at the 
impulse response functions for a typical supply and demand shock under the two alternative 
fiscal policy regimes. The next section illustrates the differences for a TFP shock and a shock to 
world demand. Notice, not only the supply shock but also the demand shock has permanent 
output and price effects, since the latter is generated via a permanent shock to world output in this 
model. 
 
3.2.1 TFP shock 
 
Figure 5 presents the level comparison of the estimated effect of an orthogonalised shock to TFP 
(
U
t ε ). The continuous line indicates the estimated model and the dotted line the model without 
systematic fiscal policy responses to output and employment gaps. As can be seen from Figure 5, 
a positive shock to TFP is associated with an increase in government consumption and transfers. 
It is well known (see Gali (1999)) that with nominal rigidities supply shocks lead to a demand 
externality. Because firms lower prices insufficiently as a response to a cost-reducing shock, 
there is a lack of aggregate demand. This is indicated by a negative output gap. Expansionary 
government consumption partially compensates for the shortfall in demand. The automatic 
stabilisation via government transfers work in  the same direction, since they  respond to the 
decline in employment and boost consumption of liquidity constrained households.  
 
In order to highlight the role played by nominal rigidities and financial market frictions it is 
useful to look at the fiscal policy response to a TFP shock and its effect in the unconstrained 
economy (Figure 6). Because there is immediate price adjustment – e. g. real wages rise 
instantaneously - there is no shortfall of demand as indicated by an output gap measure which is 
practically zero. Thus there is hardly any active response of government consumption. Also 
notice, though there is a (positive) response of transfers because of a fall in employment, this has 
no stabilising effect on output since Ricardian consumers completely offset the policy by 
increased savings. 
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FIGURE 5.    IRF’s to a shock to TFP.  
Solid lines are posterior means and confidence intervals for the estimated model, while dotted 
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FIGURE 6. IRF’s to a shock to TFP (for  0 = = = = W PW P slc γ γ γ ) 
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3.2.2 World output shock 
 
Figure 7 presents the level comparison of the estimated effect of an orthogonalised shock to 
world output (
YW
t ε ). The continuous line indicates the estimated model and the dotted line the 
model without systematic fiscal policy responses to output and employment gaps. Because of 
nominal rigidities an increase in world demand leads to an increase in capacity utilisation and 
employment. The initial excess demand is only gradually reduced by an increase in domestic 
prices. Government expenditure increases in line with nominal GDP (government purchases and 
investment) and the wage sum (transfers), but government purchases and transfers increase by 
less than is the case when there  is no stabilising response of fiscal policy (dotted line), thus 
limiting the increase in aggregate demand. The government investment rule is estimated to be 
pro-cyclical and investment rises more than proportional. The overall effect of fiscal stabilisation 
is to reduce the initial increase in employment and dampen the medium term reduction. 
Automatic stabilisation via transfers smoothes consumption of liquidity-constrained households 
C
k .  
 
Output in the unconstrained economy, without nominal rigidities and financial market frictions,  
reacts less vigorously, because the demand shock is to a large part absorbed by an increase in 
prices and the real wage (Figure 8). The positive output effects results entirely from the terms of 
trade effect induced by a permanent shift in world demand for domestic goods. Because of the 
price adjustment, the measured output gap is smaller than in the constrained economy. This 
reduces the fiscal impulse generated by government consumption. Because of the absence of 
liquidity constrained households, transfers do not affect private consumption. 
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FIGURE 7.    IRF’s to a shock to world demand. 
Solid lines are posterior means and confidence intervals for the estimated model, while dotted 
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FIGURE 8. IRF’s to a shock to world demand (for 0 = = = = W PW P slc γ γ γ )  
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3.2.2 Comparison of standard deviations with and without fiscal policy 
 
We can now turn to a quantitative analysis of the stabilisation power of fiscal policies. This 
section describes the standard deviations for the main variables we are interested in, as generated 
by the DSGE model for the two scenarios, with and without fiscal policy. Table 3.a reports the 
percentage change in the standard deviations of growth rates of the main economic variables of 
interest in the model with active stabilisation policy compared to the model without active fiscal 
policy. The table reports the changes at the infinite horizon and a negative sign indicates a 
reduction in the standard deviation of the growth rates under that particular policy rule. (Similar 
conclusions hold for the changes at the first period – details available from the authors)  The 
fiscal rule for government purchases stabilises GDP by 10.3 percent, wage taxes stabilise output 
by 2.8 percent, while the rules for government investment and transfers play a smaller role in 
reducing output volatility, each by about 1 percent. In the case of government purchases it is the 
government consumption aggregate itself which is most stabilised. Notice, however, smoothing 
government demand helps to reduce employment volatility and thereby the consumption of 
liquidity-constrained households.
11 Although non liquidity-constrained consumption is 
destabilised, the stabilising effect on liquidity-constrained consumption is strong enough to 
stabilise aggregate consumption.  
 
All fiscal rules combined yield a reduction in the volatility of GDP of 13.8 percent. Volatility in 
government consumption is reduced significantly, while government investment, a much smaller 
component of GDP, is destabilised, as the estimated response parameters were found to be 
procyclical. Fiscal policy appears to be most effective is stabilising employment (5.7 percent) and 
liquidity constrained (10.7 percent) consumption. Volatility of aggregate consumption is reduced 
by 8.7 percent.   
 
                                                 
11 We are probably underestimating the effect of automatic stabilisation of transfers since we assume that transfers 
are given in equal proportions to both types of households.   38





























































































































































Note: Posterior mean of the percentage change of standard deviation of growth rates, relative to 
model with no active fiscal policy response. In brackets we show standard error of the effect. 
 
Fiscal policy is effective in stabilising output and employment fluctuations because of nominal 
rigidities in goods and labour markets and because of financial market imperfections. This is 
shown in Table 3.b. The first column repeats the changes in volatility for the estimated model, 
while the second and third columns show the stabilising role of fiscal policy changes when we 
remove these market imperfections. We start with credit constraints and look at fiscal policy in a 
model economy which is identical in all respects to the economy as estimated except for the 
absence of liquidity constraints (slc=0). This modification has a small effect on the stabilising 
potential of government consumption w.r.t. GDP. Without liquidity-constrained consumers there 
is no role for transfers any longer to stabilise private consumption and the transfer rule remains 
completely ineffective for reducing the volatility of private consumption and GDP. Ricardian 
consumers offset any movement in transfers with private borrowing and lending. Without 
liquidity constraints, the wage tax rule has also less stabilising effect on GDP. When all fiscal 
rules are combined the stabilisation achieved in the model without liquidity constraints is falling   39
from 13.8 to 10.8 percent.  There is still a reduction in the volatility of employment, as well as in 
the volatility of aggregate consumption. 
 
Eliminating all market imperfections substantially reduces the stabilising power of fiscal policy. 
With flexible prices (γp=γw=0) and no liquidity constraints (slc=0), the estimated government 
consumption rule can reduce output fluctuations only by a 3 percent and it increases the volatility 
of private consumption (2.1 percent) and private investment (1.4 percent). Similar increases in 
volatility are found when all fiscal rules are combined. Volatility of GDP is reduced by only 3.2 
percent, while that of aggregate consumption is increased by 0.9 percent. The reduction in the 
volatility of employment (by 0.5 percent) is small and not significant in the case of government 
consumption. Obviously, progressive wage taxes have a significant stabilising impact on 
employment in the unconstrained economy. While progressive wage taxation helps to stabilise 
the consumption of liquidity constrained households and may therefore be welfare improving in a 
constrained economy, stabilisation does not play a beneficial role in the unconstrained economy.  
The smaller degree of stabilisation results from three sources. First, because of rapid price 
adjustments the output and employment gaps are smaller and prompt a smaller fiscal response to 
exogenous shocks. Second, forward looking households and firms strongly offset changes in 
government consumption. And third, in the absence of liquidity constraints there is no stabilising 
role for public transfers. 
 
This shows that the extent of fiscal stabilisation is intimately linked to the degree of market 
imperfections.  
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Table 3.b :   Fiscal Stabilisation under alternative specifications. 
















0 = = W P γ γ  
(III) 
Percentage change of standard deviation of growth rates 
 
Government Consumption rule: 
GDP  -10.31% (2.13%)   -9.79% ( 2.01%)   -2.98% ( 0.93%)  
Priv. Consumption  -0.26% (0.26%)    0.55% ( 0.69%)    2.15% ( 1.32%)  
-Liq. constrained  -0.47% (0.29%)   -  - 
-Ricardian   0.40% (0.74%)    0.55% ( 0.69%)    2.15% ( 1.32%)  
Investment   0.28% (0.33%)    0.11% ( 0.27%)    1.45% ( 0.94%)  
Gov. Consumption  -32.52% (3.34%)   -31.17% ( 2.92%)   -20.17% (24.74%)  
Transfers  -0.52% (0.48%)   -0.36% ( 0.32%)    2.85% ( 1.61%)  
Gov. Investment  -5.06% (1.09%)   -4.45% ( 0.97%)   -12.88% ( 4.84%)  
Employment  -2.25% (0.86%)   -1.80% ( 0.71%)   -0.50% ( 0.43%)  
Inflation  -0.60% (1.01%)   -0.57% ( 0.65%)    9.01% ( 2.58%)  
Wage inflation  -0.73% (0.97%)   -0.63% ( 0.64%)   -0.07% ( 0.21%)  
Real Wage inflation   0.06% (0.28%)   -0.00% ( 0.15%)    2.85% ( 1.62%)  
 
Government Transfer Rule: 
GDP  -0.81% (0.23%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)   -0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Priv. Consumption  -5.59% (1.21%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
-Liq. constrained  -7.13% (1.19%)   -  - 
-Ricardian   0.56% (0.58%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Investment   0.46% (0.33%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Gov. Consumption  -0.49% (0.11%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)   -0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Transfers  -25.83% (3.89%)   -22.46% ( 3.72%)   -0.44% ( 0.18%)  
Gov. Investment  -0.56% (0.13%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)   -0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Employment  -2.27% (0.73%)   -0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Inflation   0.15% (0.74%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Wage inflation  -0.24% (0.86%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
Real Wage inflation   0.02% (0.26%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)    0.00% ( 0.00%)  
 
Government Investment rule: 
GDP  -1.37% (0.46%)   -1.18% ( 0.39%)   -0.20% ( 0.06%)  
Priv. Consumption  -0.30% (0.28%)   -1.48% ( 0.82%)   -1.11% ( 0.63%)  
-Liq. constrained   0.12% (0.10%)   -  - 
-Ricardian  -1.63% (0.98%)   -1.48% ( 0.82%)   -1.11% ( 0.63%)  
Investment  -0.59% (0.34%)   -0.51% ( 0.30%)   -0.57% ( 0.29%)  
Gov. Consumption  -0.53% (0.20%)   -0.45% ( 0.16%)   -0.76% ( 0.27%)  
Transfers   0.01% (0.16%)    0.07% ( 0.09%)    0.27% ( 0.15%)  
Gov. Investment  38.73% (12.28%)   41.54% (13.62%)   19.52% (15.75%)  
Employment   0.27% (0.83%)    0.73% ( 0.61%)    0.57% ( 0.38%)    41
Inflation   1.89% (1.58%)    1.14% ( 1.07%)    0.75% ( 0.23%)  
Wage inflation   1.78% (1.51%)    1.13% ( 1.01%)    0.02% ( 0.03%)  
Real Wage inflation  -0.06% (0.16%)    0.01% ( 0.10%)    0.27% ( 0.15%)  
 
Wage Tax rule: 
GDP  -2.76% (1.17%)   -0.18% ( 0.09%)   -0.09% ( 0.04%)  
Priv. Consumption  -3.49% (1.46%)   -0.30% ( 0.19%)   -0.24% ( 0.14%)  
-Liq. constrained  -4.52% (1.83%)   -  - 
-Ricardian   0.39% (0.24%)   -0.30% ( 0.19%)   -0.24% ( 0.14%)  
Investment   0.09% (0.09%)   -0.18% ( 0.12%)   -0.21% ( 0.14%)  
Gov. Consumption  -1.41% (0.60%)   -0.06% ( 0.03%)   -0.09% ( 0.05%)  
Transfers   0.22% (0.18%)    0.27% ( 0.18%)    1.46% ( 1.01%)  
Gov. Investment  -1.42% (0.61%)   -0.08% ( 0.04%)   -0.10% ( 0.05%)  
Employment  -1.80% (0.80%)   -1.04% ( 0.46%)   -0.81% ( 0.47%)  
Inflation  -1.30% (0.82%)   -0.45% ( 0.35%)   -0.07% ( 0.04%)  
Wage inflation  -1.05% (0.77%)   -0.28% ( 0.30%)    0.68% ( 0.69%)  
Real Wage inflation   0.40% (0.21%)    0.23% ( 0.16%)    1.46% ( 1.02%)  
 
All fiscal rules combined: 
GDP  -13.80% (2.33%)   -10.82% ( 2.09%)   -3.25% ( 0.96%)  
Priv. Consumption  -8.68% (1.74%)   -1.19% ( 1.02%)    0.86% ( 1.54%)  
-Liq. constrained  -10.71% (1.96%)   -  - 
-Ricardian  -0.23% (1.22%)   -1.19% ( 1.02%)    0.86% ( 1.54%)  
Investment   0.18% (0.49%)   -0.54% ( 0.44%)    0.70% ( 0.92%)  
Gov. Consumption  -32.97% (3.15%)   -31.22% ( 2.88%)   -19.51% (24.90%)  
Transfers  -25.76% (3.79%)   -22.34% ( 3.64%)    4.20% ( 2.54%)  
Gov. Investment  31.97% (11.61%)   37.47% (13.21%)   16.12% (17.54%)  
Employment  -5.73% (1.44%)   -2.15% ( 1.13%)   -0.68% ( 0.70%)  
Inflation   0.06% (1.59%)    0.06% ( 0.90%)    9.65% ( 2.65%)  
Wage inflation  -0.33% (1.60%)    0.14% ( 0.85%)    0.60% ( 0.74%)  
Real Wage inflation  -13.80% (2.33%)    0.21% ( 0.19%)    4.57% ( 2.50%)  
a)  DSGE model with estimated parameters shown in Table 2. 
b)  DSGE model with the share of liquidity constrained consumers set to zero. 
c)  DSGE model with the share of liquidity constrained consumers and adjustment costs for wage 
and price setters set to zero 
 
   42
4   Conclusions 
 
This paper uses an estimated DSGE model for the euro area to study the effects of fiscal 
stabilisation policies. So far empirical work on fiscal policy has concentrated mainly on the 
effects of government spending shocks. This paper extends this literature by focussing on an 
analysis of the magnitude of fiscal stabilisation in the euro area at an aggregate level.  
 
There are at least two interesting features of the euro area economy. First, there are nominal 
rigidities in goods and labour markets, and there are financial market frictions with a significant 
share of liquidity constrained households. Second, the government is a major sector of the euro 
area economy. We considered fiscal stabilisation via government consumption, investment, 
transfers and wage taxes. Our main findings can be summarised as follows. We find empirical 
evidence for systematic countercyclical fiscal policy. Consistent with previous findings, there is a 
positive fiscal multiplier in the case of transitory fiscal shocks as required for stabilisation 
policies. However, the multiplier is smaller than one. Given the estimated fiscal rule we find that 
fiscal policy is effective in stabilising GDP. It stabilises aggregate demand and thereby 
counterbalance the demand externality arising from nominal rigidities. In addition automatic 
stabilisation via government transfers helps to smooth consumption of liquidity constrained 
household. Fiscal policy partly compensates the financial market distortion. With distorted goods 
labour and financial markets we find that the estimated fiscal policy rules reduce fluctuations in 
euro area GDP by about 14 percent. In a non-distorted economy, the volatility of GDP would be 
reduced by 3 percent. 
 
In future research we will extend this analysis in various directions. It would be interesting to 
explore how the stabilising properties of the estimated rules compare to simple optimal rules. We 
have also disregarded automatic stabilisation from other revenue components. This requires a 
more careful analysis of various tax rules. In future research, more attention will have to be 
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ANNEX 1 
 
TABLE A1:  Estimation Results: Shocks 
Prior posterior  Parameter name 
distrib mean  std  mean  std 
C σ   E_EPS_C gamma  0.05  0.03  0.1016  0.024292 
τ σ   E_EPS_ETA gamma  0.05 0.03  0.085  0.027609 
X τ σ   E_EPS_ETAX gamma  0.05  0.03  0.0534  0.02351 
EX σ   E_EPS_EX gamma  0.02  0.015  0.0215  0.00178 
G σ   E_EPS_G gamma  0.01  0.007  0.0062  0.000486 
I σ   E_EPS_I gamma  0.1  0.07  0.3351  0.102453 
IG σ   E_EPS_IG gamma  0.01  0.007  0.0074  0.000574 
IM σ   E_EPS_IM gamma  0.02  0.015  0.0186  0.001716 
NPART σ   E_EPS_L gamma  0.005  0.003  0.0039  0.000503 
LOL σ   E_EPS_LOL gamma  0.005  0.003  0.0056 0.001135 
M σ   E_EPS_M gamma  0.003  0.0015  0.0013  0.000111 
PC σ   E_EPS_PC gamma  0.003  0.0015  0.0036  0.00025 
UI σ   E_EPS_PCPI gamma  0.01  0.007  0.003  0.00022 
PM σ   E_EPS_PM gamma  0.02  0.015  0.0108  0.000743 
RPE σ   E_EPS_RPREM
E gamma  0.005  0.003  0.0018  0.000502 
rp σ   E_EPS_RPREM
K gamma  0.003  0.0015  0.0027  0.000852 
TW σ   E_EPS_TW gamma  0.025  0.015  0.0086  0.001208 
GU σ   E_EPS_TFP gamma  0.001  0.0003  0.0003 8E-05 
TR σ   E_EPS_TR gamma  0.01  0.007  0.0001  5.67E-05 
W σ   E_EPS_W gamma  0.025  0.015  0.0507  0.011195 
UP σ   E_EPS_Y gamma  0.01  0.007  0.0069  0.001161 
C ρ   RHOCE beta  0.85  0.075  0.9616  0.026278 
τ ρ   RHOETA beta  0.5  0.2  0.1045  0.056776 
X τ ρ   RHOETAX beta  0.85  0.075  0.8556  0.049693 
EX ρ   RHOEXE beta  0.85  0.075  0.9647  0.008725 
GI ρ   RHOIG beta  0.85  0.075  0.9423  0.041038 
IM ρ   RHOIME beta  0.85  0.075  0.9737  0.007616 
NPART ρ   RHOLE beta  0.85  0.075  0.977  0.008225 
Lss ρ   RHOL0 beta  0.97  0.015  0.9698  0.012736 
LOL ρ   RHOLOL beta  0.85  0.075  0.9747  0.006466 
M ρ   RHOME beta  0.5  0.2  0.2234  0.064486 
PC ρ   RHOPCE beta  0.85  0.075  0.9754  0.010131 
UI ρ   RHOPCPI beta  0.5  0.2  0.2351  0.079813 
PM ρ   RHOPME beta  0.85  0.075  0.9325  0.022655   45
RPE ρ   RHORPE beta  0.85  0.075  0.9344  0.032867 
rp ρ   RHORPK beta  0.85  0.075  0.9375  0.019573 
TR ρ   RHOTR beta  0.85  0.075  0.8599  0.07351 
TW ρ   RHOTW beta  0.5  0.2  0.5443  0.139158 
GU ρ   RHOTFP beta  0.85  0.06  0.9918  0.004761 
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Figure A1. Prior distributions (grey lines), posterior distributions (black lines) and posterior mode 
(dotted lines) of the estimated parameters. 
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Figure A2. Boxplots of the posterior distributions of the fiscal stabilisation effects for the base 
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ANNEX 2   Comparison with model with exogenous fiscal policy 
 
Comparing the posterior mean in the two model specifications (see Table A.2), we can see that 
the model with exogenous rules need larger degree of persistence for government consumption 
and investment (gslag and igslag), and for transfers the persistency moves from trslag=0 in our 
base specification to 0.947 in the exogenous TR rule. As far as other structural parameters are 
concerned, major changes concern θ  (from 2.14 to 1.8), slc (drops from 0.63 to 0.56), risk (falls 
from 0.0063 to 0.0056), rp (rises from 0.0056 to 0.0075), κ  (falls from 2.9 to 2.5), habc (from 
0,93 to 0.9). 
 
Table A2. Estimation results for the base model and for the model with exogenous rules for 
nominal shares of government consumption, investment, transfers. 
 
Posterior mean  Parameter name 
Base Exog.  rules 
2 a   A2E 0.0212  0.0276 
Y
G t 0 ,   G1E -0.5339  0 
Y




G t t 1 , 0 , +   GSUM 0.0041  0 
K γ   GAMIE 22.9549  20.98 
I γ   GAMI2E 15.6589  11.2478 
L γ   GAMLE 63.1248  59.7933 
P γ   GAMPE 20.6431  21.431 
PX γ   GAMPXE 24.411  24.2975 
W γ   GAMWE 26.5775  20.0595 
gslag  GSLAG  0.8865 0.907 
habc  HABE  0.9352 0.9049 
habl  HABLE  8.1037 4.4887 
Y
IG t 1 ,   IG1E 0.5424  0 
igslag  IGSLAG 0.8318  0.9074 
ilag  ILAGE  0.8597 0.8388 
κ   KAPPAE  2.9125 2.4845 
risk  RPREME  0.0063 0.0056 
rp  RPREMK  0.0056 0.0075 
X ω   SE  0.7295 0.728 
XW ω   SWE 0.723305  0.7199 
XW X ω ω −   SEDIFF 0.0062  0.0081 
sfp  SFPE  0.9218 0.8956 
sfpx  SFPXE  0.9539 0.9481 
sfw  SFWE  0.9523 0.9355 
C σ   SIGC  2.64 2.3667 
X σ   SIGEXE  1.4431 1.2812 
σ   SIGIME  0.6116 0.5441   58
slc  SLC  0.6312 0.5564 
spm  SPM  0.4615 0.4204 
θ   THETAE  2.1465 1.8003 
π
M t   TINFE  0.32 0.29 
Y
M t 1 ,   TYE1 0.0326  0.0135 
Y
M t 2 ,   TYE2 0.1627  0.1194 
w t1   TW1 0.7661  0 
L
TR t   TR1E -0.5367  0 
dep
TR t   TR3E 0.6178  0.0449 
trslag  TRSLAG 0  0.9471 
trsn  TRSN 0.3988  0.4099 
 
 
 